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Newsletter Summer 2018

Volume 4, Issue 1

Message from the Chair

Dear IHAP Members

This is my last message as section chair. I have especially enjoyed three aspects of IHAP section leadership. First, section leadership provides a window into how APSA operates. I will return at the end of this message to my recent interest in gender and status in American political science. Being a section chair has provided participant observation insight. Second, attending four years of IHAP meetings and deliberations makes me realize that IHAP is surely the section where I find the greatest intellectual affinity. I have assembled prize committees for two years, and observed prize decisions for four years. It is remarkable how sometimes our section chooses quantitative and other times qualitative prize winners. This year's book prize winner—Catherine Lu—is a political theorist writing about justice and reconciliation, and our article winners—Brendan Green and Austin Long—are security scholars. These outcomes were not determined by the composition of selection committees, but rather the outcomes demonstrate that IHAP committees and our section appreciate that political science insight can come from different vantage points. You all are therefore my people! Thirdly, I have gotten to work with and meet colleagues I did not know before. The last few years I have spent more time at APSA, and more time visiting with IHAP officers and members. Journal reviews and department politics can impart a cynicism about the state of our discipline. Engagement with colleagues at APSA is a useful antidote.

One thing I did as Section Chair was insist that we would not accept MANELs—all male panels. David Steinberg assembled our program this year, and this challenge was harder than he and we anticipated. This newsletter prints David's reports on why avoiding MANELs was such a challenge. We did end up with 40% of our accepted papers being from female authors, but it took work and the outcome might have disadvantaged proposals from men. I return to this topic at the end of this message.

This Newsletter provides a 50-year retrospective on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), including the views of an activist personally affected by the nuclear bomb (by Tomoko Watanabe), a historical recap of the NPT treaty (by Lisa Langdon Koch), an overview of political science literature on nuclear non-proliferation (by Etel Solingen), and two contemporary analyses—one focusing on North Korea's history with the NPT and the question of whether North Korea might be brought back into the NPT (by Naoko Aoki), and a policy-maker's perspective of the current challenges facing the NPT (by Wilfred Wan).

This newsletter also includes interviews with our book and article

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International History and Politics (IHAP)

[Website](#)

Section officers

Chair:	Karen J. Alter
Vice Chair:	Cecilia Lynch
Secretary-Treasurer:	David Edelstein
Program Chair:	David Steinberg

Newsletter Editors: Peter Harris
Tom Le

Assistant Editors: Hyeyoon Park
Erika Sato

Call for announcements

Section members are invited to send their announcements about upcoming workshops, recent books, or anything else of general interest to the editors:

peter.harris@colostate.edu
tom.le@pomona.edu

prize winners, exploring what goes into prize-worthy scholarship. The authors explain how they came to their topics, the scholarship that has inspired their own excellence, and lessons they have learned from their research.

I want to thank the IHAP officers and Board Members for agreeing to serve, especially our outgoing Executive Committee members Tanisha Fazal, Stacie Goddard, and Miles Kahler, as well Peter Harris, Tom Le, and their assistant editors Hyeyoon Park and Erika Sato for this excellent newsletter. I close by returning to the issue of gender and our profession.

One finding from my study of gender and status in American political science is that women do a disproportionate share of service-oriented leadership. The baseline of tenured political science faculty is 28% female (if we include emeritus, non-tenured and non-tenure line faculty, the baseline is about 29%). This gender imbalance means that every time we strive for gender parity, we end up over-servicing women. This analysis has led me to conclude that it is probably right to make an extra effort to address gender disparities during graduate admissions and junior faculty appointments—otherwise the baseline needle will not move. But maybe for APSA paper submissions, and especially for service-oriented work, we should recognize that 70% of political scientists are men, and therefore they should be fully represented at APSA, and by doing 70% of professional and departmental service. This goal of increasing male service is difficult, however, because women are more likely to say yes compared to men. Why do women agree to serve in percentage terms that are greater than their representation in the discipline? Surely female scholars are not *less* busy than their male counterparts. Maybe female scholars are better multi-taskers? But if women do more service, and multitask better, it is not because men can't also serve and multi-task. This statement, and David Steinberg's report below, are meant to provoke reflection. If you would like to see the larger study of Gender and Status in American Political Science, the paper is available on SSRN:

https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3235786

I hope to see you at APSA, and at our section meeting (Friday at 6:30) and/or reception (Friday at 7:30), both of which are the Friday evening of APSA. We will celebrate our prize winners, elect a new slate of section leaders (see the list created by the nomination committee), and make new friends.

Karen J. Alter
Professor of Political Science and Law, Northwestern University

Board Members:

Jeff Colgan (Brown University)
Fiona Adamson (SOAS, University of London)
Bridgett Coggins (University of California, Santa Barbara)
Tanisha Fazal (University of Minnesota)
Stacie Goddard (Wellesley College)
Miles Kahler (American University)

IHAP at APSA

The 114th APSA Annual Meeting & Exhibition will be held August 30th–September 2nd in Boston, MA, and is themed “Democracy and its Discontents.”

Announcements:

IHAP Business Meeting

Friday August 31 at 6:30 PM
Location: Marriott Hyannis

IHAP Reception*

Friday August 31 at 6:30 PM
Location: Marriott Dartmouth

* Co-hosted with History & Politics Section.

Slate of New IHAP Officers:

We will vote in this slate at our Business Meeting, 6:30-7:30 Marriot Hyannis

1. Chair -- Cecelia M. Lynch, Professor of Political Science at UC Irvine and works on religion, ethics and humanitarianism in international affairs, social movements and civil society organizations, and interpretive/qualitative methods in social science research. Cecelia has served as section co-chair for two years.

2. Vice-Chair -- Stacie Goddard, Professor of Political Science at Wellesley College and researches issues of international security with a specific focus on legitimacy, rising powers, and territorial conflict. Stacie has served on our Executive Committee.

3. Secretary-Treasurer -- Harris Mylonas, Associate Professor of Political Science and International Affairs at the Elliott School of International Affairs, George Washington University. He is interested in the processes of nation- and state-building, diaspora policies, and political development.

4. Executive Committee Member -- Narendra Subramanian, Professor of Political Science at McGill University. He studies the politics of nationalism, ethnicity, religion, gender and race in a comparative perspective, focusing primarily on India.

5. Executive Committee Member -- Joseph M. Parent, Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Notre Dame. His research examines how shifts in power affect cooperation.

6. Executive Committee Member -- Philip J. Howe, Associate Professor of Political Science at Adrian College. His academic interests include ethnic group politics and nationalism, the history and politics of Central and Eastern Europe, democracy in divided societies, comparative electoral systems, historical elections, coding party manifestos, democratization, comparative empire, and digital teaching tool development.

This slate of candidates was created by the IHAP Nomination Committees (Fiona Adamson, Jeff Colgan, Bridget Coggins)


IHAP Panels, Posters & Roundtables

“The Origins and Consequences of International Institutions” - Panel on Thurs, Aug. 30, 10:00 AM
Location: Sheraton, Beacon D

- [Click here for more information.](#)

Roundtable on “Scientific Cosmology and International Orders” - Roundtable on Thurs, Aug. 30, 12:00 PM
Location: Sheraton, Beacon B

- [Click here for more information.](#)



“Historical Perspectives on War and Peace” - Panel on Fri, Aug. 31, 8:00 AM
Location: Sheraton, Beacon D

- [Click here for more information.](#)

“International Relations in East Asia” - Panel on Fri, Aug. 31, 10:00 AM
Location: Sheraton, Beacon E

- [Click here for more information.](#)

Poster Session for IHAP – Fri, Aug. 31, 1:00 PM
Location: Hynes, Hall A

- [Click here for more information.](#)

“Change and Continuity in the Global Economy” - Panel on Sat, Sept. 1, 2:00 PM
Location: Sheraton, Beacon B

- [Click here for more information.](#)

“Long-Run Change in World Politics” - Panel on Sat, Sept. 1, 4:00 PM
Location: Sheraton, Beacon B

- [Click here for more information.](#)

Report of IHAP-APSA Section Submissions

By David Steinberg, 2018 Program Chair

- IHAP received one complete panel submission and 45 paper submissions. The section was allotted 6 panels (with a maximum of four papers per panel) plus one poster session (maximum of three papers).

- IHAP received 45 paper submissions initially. Of those 45 submissions, just 5 (11%) appeared to be from female scholars (to the best knowledge of the division chair). Prior to sending out the initial acceptances, IHAP received 8 additional submissions for proposals that listed IHAP as their second choice. Of the 53 total paper proposals under consideration at this stage, 9 were from women (17%).

- Initially, the complete panel submission was accepted along with 20 paper proposals. The gender breakdown of paper acceptances was as follows: 6 of 9 (67%) submissions from female scholars and 14 of 44 (32%) of the submissions from male scholars were accepted.

- Two of the papers that were accepted on IHAP panels were declined. To fill those two slots, I drew from a different pool of papers - those that were rejected by their first section but listed IHAP as a second choice; the papers that I initially rejected were not available, as they had been passed on to the authors' second choice. In this pool of submissions, 42% were from female scholars (8 of 27). I accepted 2 of female submissions and none of the male ones.

- IHAP panels include a total of 20 papers, 8 of which have a female author, 11 with male authors, and 1 mixed-gender paper. In other words, about 40% of the papers have female authors whereas women represented 21% of total submissions across all stages. In addition, each panel includes at least one female presenter.

Roundtable

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty at 50

Introduction

By Peter Harris, Colorado State University,
Tom Le, Pomona College,
Hyeyoon Park, Colorado State University, and
Erika Sato, Harvard Law School

This summer marks 73 years since the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki by the United States. It also marks 50 years since the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (the NPT) opened for signature. In this roundtable, our contributors take stock of the modern history of nuclear weapons and make judgments about the current and future state of the non-proliferation regime.

The roundtable begins with a contribution from Tomoko Watanabe, whose parents survived the atomic bombing of Hiroshima. For Tomoko, as for so many other Japanese, the history of nuclear weapons is a deeply personal one. For some of us, nuclear weapons intrude into our lives only in the form of news articles and academic treatises; they can appear as mere tools of statecraft, expensive bargaining chips in the great game of international politics. Tomoko offers a powerful reminder that nuclear weapons—their manufacture, handling, and storage, as well as their use—are not the playthings of world leaders, but rather constitute a genuine and immediate threat to citizens' everyday lives, safety, and happiness.

Next, Lisa Langdon Koch picks up the thread that the issue of nuclear weapons is not confined to their military-strategic implications. Koch focuses on international efforts to curb exports of material and equipment that could be used to manufacture nuclear weapons, an overlooked aspect of the non-proliferation regime that has enjoyed considerable (if incomplete) success. She concludes with a reminder that the maintenance of international norms—especially those aimed at mitigating the terrible effects of nuclear weapons—requires constant attention, work, energy, and willpower.

Naoko Aoki brings the discussion up to date with a focus on North Korea's nuclear ambitions, and especially the difficult set of circumstances that U.S.

leaders face in terms of engineering denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula. Aoki explains that the North Korea case presents unique challenges with regards to the existing NPT regime, many of which seem to have been overlooked (or severely downplayed) by the Trump administration over recent months.

Finally, Wilfred Wan offers a policy expert's perspective on the NPT and the wider non-proliferation regime. He discusses the problem of history repeating itself when so many difficult political issues concerning nuclear weapons go unresolved—especially those that set the handful of nuclear weapons states against the rest of the world's non-nuclear weapons states. Like Koch, Wan reminds us that the strength of the non-proliferation regime depends upon constant vigilance and political will.

Finally, Etel Solingen provides a masterful overview of the political science on nuclear weapons. She canvasses various approaches for studying non-proliferation, documenting how each has generated useful answers to the questions of why states pursue nuclear weapons and why they refrain from doing so. But important lacunae persist. Solingen exhorts the field to embrace complexity and the context-specific determinants of states' nuclear policies.

What all of the contributions bring into focus is that the imperfect process of non-proliferation and denuclearization that started in July 1968 still exists in the shadow of the devastating realities unleashed in August 1945. Despite some progress, the world has not escaped the threat of another devastating nuclear weapons attack. The endurance of the nuclear problem is a testament to how far-reaching nuclear institutions have come to be over time and space. Can the international community—states, activists, and ordinary citizens—move the world closer to a place of safety and security? If the NPT is to survive, aspirations may need to become realized sooner than later. Each contribution offers some hope and some cause for studied pessimism.

Living Under Mushroom Clouds

By Tomoko Watanabe, *ANT-Hiroshima*¹

I was born in Hiroshima in 1953. My parents are both *hibakusha*, or A-bomb survivors. During my childhood, the ravages of the mushroom cloud cast

¹ I am grateful to Adam Beck, Annelise Giseburt, Lissette Lorenz, and Yuichi Yokoyama for translating my Japanese drafts, making constructive comments, and proofreading the manuscript.

dark shadows on our daily lives. Over the years, I learned about my parents' and other *hibakusha*'s experiences of suffering and survival. I have felt their anger and sorrow, but also their wonderful humanity. Their powerful stories taught me to never give up on the struggle for peace. These stories are the very spirit of Hiroshima. It has become my life mission to spread this spirit.

Living closely with *hibakusha* inspired me to found a nonprofit organization, Asian Network of Trust Hiroshima (ANT-Hiroshima), to convey their messages of peace from Hiroshima. Foundational to our work is the idea that like ants, though each individual's power is limited, by working together we can move the world toward peace.

“In the 1960s, the movement against nuclear weapons splintered in Japan due to political divisions. The loss of momentum and the lack of a sense of ownership over the movement made many hibakusha feel disillusioned with political campaigns.”

For ANT-Hiroshima, peace means living in a way that preserves the dignity of all living things. Yet today, the adverse effects of nuclear technologies continue to create *hibakusha* around the world. The term “global *hibakusha*” refers to anyone who has suffered harm from any aspect of nuclear technologies, not just A-bomb survivors. Physical, psychological, and environmental damage occurs throughout the entire process of production, use, and disposal of both nuclear weapons and nuclear energy. From uranium mining to weapons testing to spent nuclear fuel handling; from the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki to the nuclear accident in Fukushima; all living beings on Earth share the legacy of living under mushroom clouds. Although they have already caused suffering to many people around the world, the dangers of nuclear technologies are still growing—to the extent that the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists' Doomsday Clock is now set at two minutes to global extinction.

We at ANT-Hiroshima recognize that to prevent this catastrophe we must learn from the past. To remember the past is to commit to the future. To this

end, I now turn to the history of Japan's experience with nuclear technologies to elucidate that the path forward should ultimately involve the abolition of all destructive nuclear technologies.

Throughout the post–World War II U.S. occupation of Japan, news about the atomic bombings of 1945 was so strictly censored that the reality of the bombings was concealed not only from people abroad but also from Japanese citizens. *Hibakusha* were prevented from learning the facts about the bombs that caused them sickness, poverty, and discrimination. However, after the occupation ended in 1952, public consciousness across Japan began to change, especially when the crew of a Japanese fishing boat, the *Daigo Fukuryu Maru* (*Lucky Dragon No.5*), was exposed to a U.S. hydrogen bomb test near the Bikini Atoll in the Pacific Ocean on March 1, 1954. Many people across the nation were profoundly shocked by the news. When Aikichi Kuboyama, the chief radio operator of the *Daigo Fukuryu Maru*, died on September 23 of that year, there was a strong public outcry against nuclear weapons.

In August 1955, the first World Congress against Hydrogen and Atomic Bombs took place in Hiroshima, bringing wide public attention to the damage caused by the atomic bombings for the first time. The conference became a springboard for the movement against nuclear weapons and for redress for *hibakusha*.

Concerned about pushback against nuclear weapons in Japan, the U.S. and Japanese governments began promoting the use of atomic energy for peace. In 1956, for example, an “Atoms for Peace” exhibit was held at the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum. Its original exhibits depicting the damage wrought by the bombing were temporarily relocated. Due to the success of these government-led campaigns, the *hibakusha* of Hiroshima and Nagasaki adopted a conciliatory stance toward the peaceful use of nuclear energy, while still condemning its military use. Many Japanese people began to believe that nuclear energy was safe.

In the 1960s, the movement against nuclear weapons splintered in Japan due to political divisions. The loss of momentum and the lack of a sense of ownership over the movement made many *hibakusha* feel disillusioned with political campaigns. Keeping their distance from such campaigns, many *hibakusha* focused on commemorating the dead and trying to rebuild their lives without speaking about their own experiences—either publicly or privately.

Around the same time, the international community began searching for a path toward nuclear disarmament, roused to action in part by the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis. In 1968, the U.S.-led Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) was opened for signatures, and it took effect in 1970. Japan's *hibakusha* pinned their hopes for nuclear abolition on this treaty, wishing that eventually all member states would honor their promise to eliminate their nuclear arsenals. *Hibakusha* wavered between hope and disappointment with each new development at the NPT Review Conferences (held every five years), as sustained progress on nuclear disarmament failed to materialize. They repeatedly organized sit-in protests in the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Park, raised their voices in opposition to nuclear testing, and shared their experiences of the bombings with people all over the world.

Then, in 1979, the first major nuclear accident occurred at Three Mile Island in the United States. Since then, major accidents have occurred at Chernobyl (Ukraine, 1986) and Fukushima Dai Ichi (Japan, 2011). These accidents are all testimonies to the fact that even nuclear energy poses a significant threat to humanity and the natural world. After Fukushima, the *hibakusha* of Hiroshima and Nagasaki came to firmly believe that if atomic power continues to be used, whether for military or civilian purposes, then life on earth faces a bleak future.

In the past decade, an international campaign focusing on the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons led to the creation of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), which was adopted at the United Nations on July 7, 2017. However, the nuclear powers stand in opposition to this new treaty.

This year marks the 50th anniversary of the NPT. Although not perfect, the NPT is currently the only international treaty that imposes the obligation of nuclear disarmament on the nuclear powers—its importance should not be undervalued. However, little progress has been made. Even since the end of the Cold War, the global state of nuclear weapons proliferation has not significantly improved. The *hibakusha* are growing older, and many of the key leaders of the movement against nuclear weapons have passed away. Memories of the atomic bombings are fading without the world having truly understood the horror and pain caused by nuclear weapons and radiation. Worse still, some states are moving to modernize their nuclear arsenals through the creation of smaller, “more useable” weapons to conduct “limited” warfare. Such developments threaten

international norms against nuclear weapons use by lowering the threshold of destruction, but even a regional nuclear war would have dire consequences for the planet.

The *hibakusha* of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, who endured the living hell of the atomic bombings and their aftermath, have pledged to help the rest of humanity overcome this crisis by communicating their own experiences. It is only through them that we can know the true effects of nuclear weapons. And now, they are taking another step forward, toward the total elimination of nuclear power in all its detrimental forms.

The destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki are not just historical events; they are potential glimpses into a nightmarish future. Thus, Hiroshima and Nagasaki are a call to action. On February 25, 1981, Pope John Paul II called for nuclear abolition during a visit to Hiroshima. In his “Appeal for Peace,” the Pope emphasized, “to remember the past is to commit oneself to the future.” At the age of 27, I heard the Pope’s message in person, and I realized the path I must take. Even today, my mission has not changed; I hold the same conviction in my heart. It is written in the Japanese Constitution that “all peoples of the world have the right to live in peace.” To protect that right, I have chosen a path that demands the end of nuclear weapons, before they put an end to humanity.

My life is part of Hiroshima’s history of destruction and rebirth. Turning tragedy into hope is the mission of my organization and my city, and I have dedicated the last 30 years to working for that mission at the grassroots level.

It is our duty to hand down to our children a world where everyone can live in peace. I want to help build such a world, one ruled not by might but by justice and equality based on mutual trust. This is my earnest desire as a person from Hiroshima. I want to hold my city’s message firmly in mind, raise my voice, take action, and open a new chapter in human history.

“Although not perfect, the NPT is currently the only international treaty that imposes the obligation of nuclear disarmament on the nuclear powers—its importance should not be undervalued.”

The NPT at 50 and the NSG at 43: How the Global Control of Nuclear Exports Has Slowed Proliferation

By Lisa Langdon Koch, Claremont McKenna College

The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons was negotiated at a time when many predicted the proliferation of nuclear weapons would not only continue, but would occur at an increasing rate. Sober assessments from U.S. officials during the Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson administrations reflected the common fear that nuclear proliferation would be both rapid and extensive.¹ One report predicted that a new wave of proliferation would begin as the costs of nuclear development fell.²

These fears of widespread, uncontrollable proliferation were not realized in the decades that followed. Indeed, many states that started down the path to nuclear weapons actually reversed course, making decisions along the way to slow or suspend their programs. As a result, the NPT has often been hailed as an example of a successful international treaty. The deepening of the anti-nuclear norm, the institutionalization of nonproliferation cooperation among states, and the implementation of a truly global monitoring and verification practice locate either their origins or their evolution in the NPT. Less examined, however, is the international regime that was written into the NPT as an aspiration but would not materialize for seven more years: the global effort to control nuclear exports.

As the NPT was being negotiated, the International Atomic Energy Agency, founded in 1957, was operating in a nascent export safeguarding system that had been limited to controlling only a few types of equipment.³ The discussion of safeguards conducted during the treaty negotiations resulted in Article III of the NPT, which stated that certain fissionable materials and equipment should only be

transferred to non-nuclear weapons states under safeguard arrangements. The safeguards would allow for verification that the exported items would not be redirected from civilian nuclear energy programs to weapons development.

However, negotiations did not result in the identification of which materials and equipment should fall under safeguards. Accordingly, the language in the NPT regarding the control of these nuclear exports was left intentionally vague. Recognizing that Article III was aspirational rather than actionable, a group of states began holding secret, informal meetings in Vienna to discuss the creation of export control guidelines, but agreed that their decisions would still not be legally binding.⁴

Thus, the NPT and the group of states known as the NPT Exporters' Committee (or Zangger Committee, informally) laid the groundwork for what had the potential to be a working export control regime. What was lacking was political will. In 1974, a catalyzing event delivered that political will to the nuclear supplier states: India's "peaceful nuclear explosion," a nuclear test that surprised the world and announced India's entry into the nuclear club. The reactor that produced the plutonium for the test had been built with assistance from Canada and supplied with materials from the United States—all unsafeguarded.⁵ The nuclear suppliers had failed to turn Article III's hopes into reality, and the consequences were both unambiguous and unpleasant.

The speed at which the nuclear suppliers moved after the shock of India's May test was impressive: by July, the Committee had agreed on an initial list of material and equipment that could not be exported without triggering IAEA safeguards for the receiving state. By September, the list was active, and export control conditions were being inserted into contract negotiations that were already underway.⁶ The

¹ Nina Tannenwald, "Stigmatizing the Bomb: Origins of the Nuclear Taboo," *International Security* 29, no. 4 (2005): 5–49; Ariel E. Levite, "Never Say Never Again: Nuclear Reversal Revisited," *International Security* 27, no. 3 (2002): 59–88; William C. Davidon, Christoph Hohenemser, and Marvin I. Kalkstein, "The Nth Country Problem: A World-Wide Survey of Nuclear Weapons Capabilities" (Brookline, MA: The American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1959).

² Robert McNamara, "The Diffusion of Nuclear Weapons with and without a Test Ban Agreement, Memorandum to President John F. Kennedy," February 12, 1963, Document No. NP00941, Digital National Security Archive.

³ Jack Boureston, "Strengthening Nuclear Safeguards: Special Committee To the Rescue?," *Arms Control Today* 35, no. 10 (2005): 17–22.

⁴ Fritz W. Schmidt, "The Zangger Committee: Its History and Future Role," *The Nonproliferation Review* 2, no. 1 (1994): 38–44; Carlton E. Thorne, "Nuclear Export Controls," in *IAEA Safeguards for the 21st Century* (Taejon, ROK, 1999), 1–14.

⁵ The United States provided the heavy water used as a moderator in the reactor. Leonard S. Spector, *Nuclear Ambitions: The Spread of Nuclear Weapons 1989-1990* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1990).

⁶ Tadeusz Strulak, "The Nuclear Suppliers Group," *The Nonproliferation Review* 1, no. 1 (1993): 2–10; Ian

supplier states established a Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) the following year, which, unlike the Zangger Committee, was open to non-NPT members, such as France.⁷ By 1977, the NSG had grown to fifteen members; today, it stands at forty-eight.

The NPT itself was neither amended nor renegotiated to incorporate these new controls. But the NPT had provided the impetus for the supplier states to convene informally, which in turn had laid the foundation that allowed the states to react quickly to India's test. Whether the NSG and the export control regime its members created have been successful in slowing the spread of nuclear weapons is an open question. I argue in a recent working paper that while the regime has not prevented proliferation, it has made the process of buying and selling nuclear items slower, costlier, and more difficult. In doing so, the export control regime delays the progress of nuclear weapons programs, and frustrates the leaders who make decisions about whether to continue investing in those programs.⁸ The success of the NSG has not been in ending nuclear proliferation, but in managing it.

The new export control regime had immediate effects, as states receiving controlled items now had to accept safeguards. Some NSG members, like Canada, went further; beginning in 1974, states receiving controlled items from Canada had to be party to the NPT and provide the Canadian government with formal assurances that nuclear items would be handled appropriately.⁹ Requests for nuclear transfers immediately slowed, and then continued to decline. Over time, state-to-state transfers of nuclear weapons technology and equipment have nearly ended.¹⁰

The NSG's detractors point out that the export control regime has gaps, or leaks. Exporting firms or states may violate the regime, transferring controlled goods illegally in order to profit from sales, or to help

advance an ally's covert program. States pursuing nuclear weapons development can attempt to circumvent the regime in several ways, with the most infamous being the acquisition of items from black market networks. Buyers and sellers have, over the decades, adopted ever more complex tactics to circumvent the export controls, such as establishing third-party front companies in other countries, or transporting the goods using multiple ships flying different national flags to obscure the true end-receiver of the controlled item.¹¹ These sophisticated workarounds drive up the costs for the exporter, which are passed along to the importer.

“The destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki are not just historical events; they are potential glimpses into a nightmarish future.”

However, these very tactics demonstrate that the barriers imposed by the NSG's export control regime have practical effects. If the regime was toothless, why would buyers and sellers have engaged in increasingly inefficient and expensive methods for trade? The NSG has behaved as a strategic actor, responding to new tactics by revising the regime's methods. Famously, Saddam Hussein's nuclear weapons program imported dual-use goods from NSG members in a largely successful attempt to obscure the military nature of the Iraqi nuclear program. The NSG responded to the discovery of the Iraqi program by imposing stronger barriers to dual-use transfers, making dual-use item procurement much more difficult, time-consuming, and expensive.¹² Indeed, the Group continuously reviews, clarifies, and adds to its lists of controlled items when buyers try to find substitutes for the items or to exploit nonspecific language.¹³ We can observe the success

Anthony, Christer Ahlstrom, and Vitaly Fedchenko, *Reforming Nuclear Export Controls: The Future of the Nuclear Suppliers Group* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).

⁷ Strulak, “The Nuclear Suppliers Group.”

⁸ Available from the author. The paper abstract is online at ilkoch.weebly.com/research.html.

⁹ Anthony, Ahlstrom, and Fedchenko, *Reforming Nuclear Export Controls*.

¹⁰ Ian J. Stewart, “Export Controls at the Crossroads,” *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, October 15, 2015, <http://thebulletin.org/export-controls-crossroads8806>.

¹¹ Several states are infamous for doing this. For examples of North Korean efforts, see Hui Zhang, “Assessing North Korea's Uranium Enrichment Capabilities,” *Bulletin of*

the Atomic Scientists, June 18, 2009,

<https://thebulletin.org/assessing-north-koreas-uranium-enrichment-capabilities>; Armin Rosen, “How North Korea Built Its Nuclear Program,” *The Atlantic*, April 10, 2013,

<https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/04/how-north-korea-built-its-nuclear-program/274830/>.

¹² Strulak, “The Nuclear Suppliers Group.”

¹³ “Nuclear Suppliers Group - Guidelines,” n.d., <http://www.nuclearsuppliersgroup.org/en/guidelines>; the latest updates, made annually, were agreed to at the 2017 NSG Plenary meeting: “Communications Received from Members Regarding the Export of Nuclear Material and of Certain Categories of Equipment and Other Material, INFCIRC/209,” International Atomic Energy Agency,

of the export control regime in part by observing the action-reaction dynamic of the exporters and the NSG.

Further, even though buyers can still succeed in obtaining controlled items by using these workarounds, the delay and extra cost that is incurred negatively affect a nuclear weapons program's progress. Black market items, for example, have often tended to be outdated, discarded spare parts; receiving programs try to use the technology and end up facing serious setbacks when the used equipment malfunctions.¹⁴ Delays and failures can contribute to leaders' perceptions that their nuclear aspirations are out of reach, and are no longer worth the resources and time required.¹⁵

Fifty years after the NPT opened for signature, and forty-three years after the formation of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the world has avoided the rampant

Can North Korea Be Brought Back Into the NPT?

By Naoko Aoki, *University of Maryland*

U.S. President Donald Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un met in Singapore on June 12, marking the first summit between the two countries and the latest effort by the United States to denuclearize North Korea through diplomacy. In a short joint statement issued after the talks, Kim committed to working toward the "complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula."¹ Could this mean that North Korea may return to compliance as a non-nuclear member of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), from which it withdrew in 2003?

While the relationship between North Korea's nuclear program and the NPT has been analyzed from various angles in the past and much about the goal of

n.d.,

<https://www.iaea.org/publications/documents/infcircs/communications-received-members-regarding-export-nuclear-material-and-certain-categories-equipment-and-other-material>.

¹⁴ R. Scott Kemp, "The Nonproliferation Emperor Has No Clothes: The Gas Centrifuge, Supply-Side Controls, and the Future of Nuclear Proliferation," *International Security* 38, no. 4 (2014): 39–78.

¹⁵ Interested readers may request the author's working paper.

proliferation so many feared. As the NSG looks ahead to the next half-century of counter-proliferation, NSG participating governments can work in both the public and private sectors to improve the global effectiveness of the export control regime. But export control efforts may deteriorate if participating governments politicize the control regime. As the NSG considers politically divisive issues, such as whether to allow India, which remains outside the NPT, to join the Group, it will be important to keep the process for making technical decisions about export controls separate from political entanglements. The next fifty years will bring new challenges, and the NSG will be more likely to be effective if its participating governments continue to act, and react, to manage proliferation as it evolves.

denuclearization stated at the Singapore summit remains unclear, this short article considers some of the key questions that need to be answered if North Korea's return to the NPT is to become a possibility after the Singapore summit.

North Korea became a signatory to the NPT in 1985, but its relationship with the treaty was problematic from the beginning. There were repeated delays in North Korea's negotiations with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) over a safeguards agreement that would allow the agency to carry out inspections. When inspections finally took place in 1992, the IAEA found discrepancies between what North Korea reported as its plutonium stockpile and what the agency found through its own analyses. North Korea refused IAEA's demand of special inspections and announced in March 1993 that it was withdrawing from the NPT. An agreement between the United States and North Korea suspended this attempt at withdrawal a day before it was due to take effect.² Tensions were reduced in 1994, when the

¹ White House, "Joint Statement of President Donald J. Trump of the United States of America and Chairman Kim Jong Un of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea at the Singapore Summit," June 12, 2018, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/joint-statement-president-donald-j-trump-united-states-america-chairman-kim-jong-un-democratic-peoples-republic-korea-singapore-summit/>.

² For the history of North Korea's nuclear program, see for example, Don Oberdorfer and Robert Carlin, *The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History*, (New York: Basic Books, 2013), 196–224, and Jonathan D. Pollack, *No Exit: North Korea, Nuclear Weapons, and International*

United States and North Korea signed the Agreed Framework, which froze North Korea's plutonium program and committed Pyongyang to remain in the NPT. But that accord collapsed due to a dispute in 2002 over North Korea's procurement of materials for a uranium enrichment program which gave Pyongyang another path to a bomb,³ and North Korea declared again in January 2003 that it was withdrawing from the NPT.⁴ An attempt to denuclearize North Korea through engagement and bring the country back into the NPT was made in the 2000s through the Six-Party Talks involving China, Japan, the two Koreas, Russia and the United States. North Korea promised to return to the NPT in a 2005 statement issued by the six parties,⁵ but that deal failed in 2009 over a dispute on verification methods for North Korea's nuclear programs.

The challenge of denuclearizing North Korea and bringing the country back into compliance with its NPT obligations is bigger today. North Korea has a larger stockpile of nuclear weapons and fissile material than the last time a major diplomatic effort was made through the Six-Party Talks. The United States and North Korea are also pursuing top-down style diplomacy this time. The Singapore summit set out vague goals of denuclearization and improvement of relations between the United States and North Korea, but the two countries have yet to agree on a concrete roadmap for denuclearization. Unlike the past two denuclearization agreements, there was no mention of the NPT in the Singapore statement.

A major question mark hangs over whether North Korea is willing to return to the NPT. Under the current system, North Korea can only do so as a non-nuclear weapon state.⁶ While North Korea said in Singapore that it would work toward denuclearization, what Pyongyang means by that has yet to be clarified. North Korea's interpretation may

be, for example, that the country would denuclearize if other nuclear states do so as well. Statements made by North Korea in recent years strongly indicate that rejoining the NPT as a non-nuclear member is not Pyongyang's preferred path. For example, Kim Jong Un said in his New Year address—which is considered the country's policy guidance for the following year—that his country has established a “state nuclear force” and that the country is now a “responsible nuclear power.”⁷

“A major question mark hangs over whether North Korea is willing to return to the NPT.”

It is also unclear whether the United States would prioritize North Korea's return to the NPT as one of its demands. This is because NPT rules impact the scope of restrictions Washington could place on Pyongyang's nuclear activities. Does the United States envision stopping all of North Korea's nuclear activities, including civilian nuclear energy and medical use? Or is it going to aim to put some limits on these “inalienable rights” for non-nuclear NPT members?⁸ The two denuclearization agreements that the United States had with North Korea in the past tried to prevent North Korea's nuclear weapons development while respecting Pyongyang's right to peaceful use of nuclear energy. An important element of the 1994 Agreed Framework, for example, was the replacement of North Korea's graphite-moderated reactors with two light-water reactors, which produce nuclear material that is more difficult to convert into fuel for weapons.⁹

Security (London, International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2011), 107-111.

³ For example, see Oberdorfer and Carlin, *The Two Koreas*, 347-380.

⁴ Korean Central News Agency, “Statement of DPRK Government on its Withdrawal from NPT,” January 10, 2003 and Korean Central News Agency, “Letter to IAEA Director General,” January 11, 2003. There is no definitive legal conclusion to North Korea's status at the NPT.

⁵ State Department, “Joint Statement of the Fourth Round of the Six-Party Talks,” September 19, 2005, <https://www.state.gov/p/eap/regional/c15455.htm>.

⁶ The NPT defines a nuclear weapon state as one who manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device before January 1, 1967. The

nuclear weapon states are China, France, Russia, United Kingdom and the United States. See Article IX of United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, “Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,” accessed August 1, 2018,

<https://www.un.org/disarmament/wmd/nuclear/npt/text>

⁷ Foreign Ministry of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, “Kim Jong Un Makes New Year Address,” January 1, 2018, <http://www.mfa.gov.kp/en/new-year-address-2/>.

⁸ See Article IV of the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, “Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.”

⁹ State Department, “Agreed Framework Between the United States and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea,” October 21, 1994, <https://2001-2009.state.gov/t/ac/rls/or/2004/31009.htm>.

Even if North Korea were willing to return to the NPT and the scope of restrictions on the country's nuclear activities were settled without a problem, a tricky issue remains. This issue concerns the question of North Korea's noncompliance before its withdrawal in 2003.¹⁰ The question of the discrepancies in North Korea's declared plutonium and the findings of the IAEA that triggered the first nuclear crisis in 1993 has never been solved. In addition, the IAEA was limited to monitoring North Korea's frozen plutonium facilities in the years when Agreed Framework was in effect and Pyongyang remained in the NPT.¹¹ North Korea's return to the NPT without consequences for its behavior raises the question of undermining treaty compliance norms.

The biggest challenge to bringing North Korea back into compliance with its NPT commitments as a non-nuclear weapon state is convincing Pyongyang to do so. As North Korea has repeatedly demanded that it be considered a nuclear power, it is extremely unlikely to agree to these commitments, at least in the near future.

The NPT and the Gathering Storm

By Wilfred Wan, *United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research*¹

The Review Conference (RevCon) marked a new nadir for the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The subject of frustration was the perceived lack of implementation of Article VI, which compels states parties to "pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to... nuclear disarmament."² A group of non-nuclear weapon states challenged the five recognized nuclear weapon states to follow through with their commitments, calling for stockpile reductions and test ban treaty progress.³ They drew attention to the perceived hypocrisy of the nuclear club, expressing displeasure at the idea of additional non-proliferation

¹⁰ This point has been raised by John Gershman and Wade L. Huntley, "North Korea & the NPT," *Institute for Policy Studies*, October 2, 2005, https://ips-dc.org/north_korea_the_npt/.

¹¹ International Atomic Energy Agency, "Fact Sheet on DPRK Nuclear Safeguards," accessed August 1, 2018, <https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/focus/dprk/fact-sheet-on-dprk-nuclear-safeguards>.

¹ The views expressed in this publication are the author's sole responsibility and do not reflect the views or

The level of restrictions the United States will demand of North Korea's nuclear program—and the level Pyongyang will allow—also impact the question of North Korea's NPT status. If, like in the past, North Korea's civilian nuclear energy use is to be respected, the goal would be to dismantle Pyongyang's nuclear weapons and facilitate its return to NPT as a non-nuclear weapon state. But even then, North Korea's past noncompliance may pose problems for NPT norms. The Singapore summit opened the slight possibility of bringing North Korea back into the NPT fold, but whether this will become one of the goals of the United States' current engagement effort and whether that becomes achievable will depend on the many political judgments to be made by Washington and Pyongyang in the months ahead.

obligations.⁴ The division between the groups would doom the RevCon.

The year was 1980.

In 2018, this story sounds familiar because it is. NPT states parties have been unable to produce a substantive final document in more than half of its nine quinquennial review conferences—the most recent instance being in 2015. Nuclear disarmament has been a consistently divisive topic in those conferences. While the 2015 RevCon fell apart primarily because of the lack of agreement on a Middle East WMD-Free Zone, the pace and scope of disarmament was again a point of contention. In the waning days of the conference, the President, Ambassador Taous Feroukhi of Algeria, pointed to a gulf in views over the interpretation of "effective

opinions of the United Nations, UNIDIR, its staff members or sponsors.

² "Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons", 1968.

³ "Working paper containing some basic elements for the sections of the final document of the Conference dealing with items allocated to Main Committee I by States Members of the Group of 77 participating in the Second NPT Review Conference," NPT/CONF.II/C.I/2, 9 September 1980.

⁴ See plenary meeting records, including comments from Australia and Finland.

measures” under Article VI, and the nature of nuclear weapon state reporting.⁵

As the 2020 NPT RevCon approaches, policymakers and analysts are already stressing the importance of a successful conference that produces a consensus final document, and pushing for states parties to both review and recommit themselves to the global nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament agenda. There is added significance for the RevCon not only because of the 2015 outcome but because it comes on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the treaty’s entry into force. “Back-to-back breakdowns could be more significant” in that context.⁶ At the 2018 Preparatory Committee, states called for “every effort... to avoid another failure,” noting that “the stakes are too high.”⁷

The regularity with which states parties have been unable to produce consensus outcome documents, however, seems to undermine the notion that individual RevCons are of crucial importance. After all, the treaty has been able to weather past failed conferences. The NPT has maintained its near-universal membership and widespread support for its role as the centerpiece of global nuclear order. Its apparent resilience is reinforced by the fact that the issues faced by the NPT regime appear as “legacies, reiterations or reincarnations of problems that [it] has failed over many years to tackle effectively.”⁸ If it can survive regardless of effectiveness, some might wonder, what exactly is at stake for the NPT in 2020?

It is true that the broad nature of the challenge is familiar to NPT states parties, and can be traced back to the treaty’s very beginnings. What is different now, however, is the unprecedented scope of issues facing the regime. While the focus on RevCon outcomes as the metric for success or failure is arguably misplaced (as some have noted, no consensus document may be preferable to a weak one), the need to uphold the NPT and strengthen its stewardship regime is very real. Discussions in that forum reveal the level of commitment by states

parties to tackling nuclear challenges. NPT states parties now face an approaching moment unlike any in the treaty’s history, one that really does threaten the treaty and regime.

“The NPT has maintained its near-universal membership and widespread support for its role as the centerpiece of global nuclear order.”

Why now? First, the 2017 Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) irrevocably alters the dynamics between nuclear weapon states and non-nuclear weapon states. It marks a tangible manifestation of their differing approaches to nuclear disarmament. None of the five recognized nuclear-weapon states participated in the TPNW’s negotiation, and the United States, United Kingdom, and France issued a joint statement following TPNW adoption that emphasized that they “do not intend to sign, ratify or ever become party to it” while criticizing it for “creating even more divisions.”⁹ There is fear that the nuclear weapon states will use the treaty as an excuse to disengage entirely from the issue of nuclear disarmament. At the same time, nuclear weapon states and their allies seem to fear that some non-nuclear weapon states are intent on turning the TPNW, which in principle complements the NPT’s aims, into a rival standard that will undercut support for the NPT regime.¹⁰

Second, the now-tenuous status of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) negotiated between the P5+1 and Iran casts a shadow over the non-proliferation regime. Recall that the JCPOA sought to resolve a decade-long standoff that stemmed from reports of NPT-IAEA safeguards violations in 2003. The deal itself hinted at deficiencies in the existing system: it necessitated

⁵ See Summary Records of the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

⁶ Lewis A. Dunn, “The Strategic Elimination of Nuclear Weapons: An Alternative Global Agenda for Nuclear Disarmament,” *The Nonproliferation Review* 24, No. 5-6 (2017), p. 410.

⁷ “General Statement on behalf of the Group of Member States of the Non-Aligned Movement Parties to the NPT,” Jorge Valero, 23 April 2018; “Preparatory Committee for the 2020 NPT Review Conference - General statement by the Nordic countries - General statement by the Nordic countries,” Andrés Jato, 22 April 2018.

⁸ Rebecca Johnson, “Rethinking the NPT’s Role in Security: 2010 and Beyond,” *International Affairs* 86, no. 2 (2010), p. 429.

⁹ “Joint Press Statement from the Permanent Representatives to the United Nations of the United States, United Kingdom, and France Following the Adoption of a Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons,” 7 July 2017.

¹⁰ Lewis A. Dunn, “The Strategic Elimination of Nuclear Weapons”; John Borrie, *Resuming Dialogue on Moving Nuclear Disarmament Forward: An Immediate Challenge*, UNIDIR, 2018.

expanding the range of sites in Iran for potential inspection, enhancing surveillance across the country's nuclear supply chain, and severely limiting Iran's uranium enrichment activities. That this was still insufficient for the current U.S. president suggests a vast perception gap regarding the nature of rights and obligations by the two types of NPT states parties. In fact, the secretary of Iran's Supreme National Security Council has suggested NPT withdrawal as a response should the JCPOA collapse.¹¹ Some fear a worst-case scenario in which this action could open the door for a "breakout"—in the process exposing fundamental shortcomings in the treaty's enforcement mechanisms in a manner reminiscent of the DPRK's withdrawal in 2003.

Third, the NPT continues to be challenged by four states that have held out against joining the regime (or rejoining, in the case of the DPRK), all of which are nuclear-armed and engaged in increasingly confrontational behavior. The DPRK's weapons development progresses, and there are indications that it has increased production of enriched uranium despite ongoing talks with the United States.¹² Meanwhile, India and Pakistan are locked in a new nuclear arms race.¹³ Yet compliant non-nuclear weapon states cannot help but notice that India's campaign to join the Nuclear Suppliers Group gains momentum, and bilateral civil nuclear cooperation deals (U.S.-India, China-Pakistan) have conferred upon non-state parties benefits that are meant to be derived exclusively from treaty adherence.¹⁴ For others, Israel's relationship with the United States has shielded it from warranted opprobrium even as it remains studiously ambiguous about its nuclear capabilities. These cases strain the credibility of the regime.

Fourth, current global security developments are weakening the foundation undergirding the NPT. Relations between Russia and the West are at their lowest point since the Cold War, with an accompanying impact in the nuclear realm; both

Russia and the United States are embarking on major nuclear modernization programs. Russia's expulsion from the G8 stalled the work of the Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction. It has withdrawn from a host of bilateral and multilateral venues, including the Nuclear Security Summit series and the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program; the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty may expire in 2021 with no successor.¹⁵ While these activities do not fall strictly within NPT confines, the treaty's vast agenda necessitates a high level of cooperation among the nuclear weapon states, and especially the two states with the biggest arsenals in the world. The deepening chill in relations between Washington and Moscow has already profoundly challenged the continued relevance and efficacy of the nuclear arms control structure.¹⁶ Strained relations will further negatively impact their ability to enhance non-proliferation, advance disarmament, and facilitate development for peaceful use.

The demise of the NPT has long been predicted. But if it actually does collapse, it will not be the result of any single event, or any review conference outcome, even the one in 2020. Rather, the strength of the NPT is and always has been intertwined with widespread belief in its principles, with adherence to its obligations, with commitment to its 'grand bargain.' The 2020 RevCon ultimately matters less than what comes before and what comes after. It stands as all previous review conferences do, as a barometer for the general state of the global nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament regime. From that perspective, current developments across the nuclear landscape are concerning, and indicate more rough waters ahead. The resiliency of the NPT should not be overestimated. After all, frustration with the pace of nuclear disarmament drove the process leading to the TPNW. Critical moments may soon loom elsewhere; the treaty's foundation may be irrevocably eroded. The NPT's future, and that of global non-proliferation and disarmament, is at stake.

¹¹ "Iran Might Withdraw from NPT if Nuclear Deal is Scrapped: Senior Official," *Reuters*, 24 April 2018. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-nuclear-npt/iran-might-withdraw-from-npt-if-nuclear-deal-is-scrapped-senior-official-idUSKBN1HV0UU>

¹² "U.S. Intelligence Believes North Korea Making More Nuclear Bomb Fuel Despite Talks: NBC," *Reuters*, 30 June 2018, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-northkorea-missiles-usa-report/u-s-intelligence-believes-north-korea-making-more-nuclear-bomb-fuel-despite-talks-nbc-idUSKBN1JQ03O>

¹³ Eric Schlosser, "The Growing Dangers of the New Nuclear-Arms Race," *The New Yorker*, 24 May 2018,

<https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/the-growing-dangers-of-the-new-nuclear-arms-race>.

¹⁴ In recent years, India has become a member of the Missile Technology Control Regime, the Wassenaar Arrangement, and the Australia Group.

¹⁵ Richard Stone, "Russia Suspends Nuclear R&D Pact with United States," *Science*, 7 October 2016.

¹⁶ Eugene Rumer, "A Farewell to Arms... Control," *U.S.-Russia Insight*, 17 April 2018. <https://carnegieendowment.org/2018/04/17/farewell-to-arms-.-.-control-pub-76088>.

International Theory, History, and Politics: The Nuclear Proliferation Conundrum

By Etel Solingen, University of California, Irvine

The editors organized this Symposium, quite appropriately for the *International History and Politics Newsletter*, on the 50th anniversary of the opening for signature of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The North Korean crisis and the Trump administration's retreat from the JCPOA, along with other developments in the nuclear domain, make this an appropriate time for reflection. Several articles and postings have examined those developments while revisiting theories of nuclear proliferation.¹ The choices to acquire nuclear weapons or abstaining from doing so are rooted in temporal historical sequences and contingencies that "usual suspect" variables cannot easily capture. Across the theoretical and methodological spectrum there has been a tendency to neglect appropriate periodization and critical historical junctures. All cases since 1945 are lumped together as if the NPT ratification in 1970 made no difference. Yet the latter incepted a world-time with distinctive features from the historical context that preceded it, with attendant consequences for nuclear choices in each period.

Typical neorealist explanations for who goes nuclear have come in different flavors, emphasizing relative power, self-help, and state survival in an anarchic world. Studies in this tradition focus singlehandedly on "reasons of state" to explain nuclear choices. Yet, as students of history and politics know too well, there are often yawning gaps between what leaders claim as justification and actual motives for behavior. Domestic political expediency is never too removed from political choices. While compelling in some instances, neorealist premises also raise serious methodological and epistemological problems; are

ill-suited to explain a wide range of cases (sometimes crucial ones) and typically overpredict proliferation, a rare event. Richard Betts put it cogently: insecurity is not a sufficient condition for acquiring nuclear weapons; many insecure states have not. Alliances certainly make a difference.² But even states unprotected by nuclear umbrellas, whose rivals acquired nuclear weapons (!), not always responded in kind (e.g., Egypt, Vietnam, Jordan and many others). Highly deplorable threats from President Trump to North Korea strengthen external threats as rationale for seeking such weapons. Yet, they also illustrate the pitfall of projecting backwards into rear-view mirrors. After all, North Korea's unrelenting pursuit of nuclear weapons goes back several decades. Narang and Miller find theories focused on external threats especially deficient for explaining North Korea, a crucial case.³ Why would credible threats of force and sanctions lead to doubling down on nuclear pursuit in some cases but not others? The answer to this question may be linked to domestic regime survival considerations that do not necessarily line up conceptually with balances of (state) power. Furthermore, elastic and subjective definitions of power and vulnerability overwhelm the theory's ability to identify a priori thresholds that compel nuclearization. For all persisting predictions over several decades, the nuclearization of no less than three of its neighbors have not led Japan to acquire its own nuclear weapons, even as U.S. signals of commitment weakened dramatically,⁴ most recently under Trump.

The inception of the nonproliferation regime (NPR), one of the most subscribed international treaties in existence, provides a different rationale for nuclear choices. Over 190 states would come to rely on a web of international institutions that facilitated monitoring of compliance and mutual incentives to forego nuclear weapons. Failures of compliance and outright defection, while important, were not as extensive as one might have expected in a domain of "high security," large number of members, and complicated

¹ Nicholas L. Miller and Vipin Narang, "How North Korea Shocked the Nuclear Experts," *Politico*, 26 August 2017, <https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2017/08/26/north-korea-nuclear-tests-shock-experts-215533>; and Joshua Pollack, "Bombs and Dollars," *Arms Control Wonk*, 27 August 2017, <https://www.armscontrolwonk.com/archive/1203785/bombs-and-dollars/>.

² Alexandre Debs and Nuno P. Monteiro, *Nuclear Politics: The Strategic Causes of Proliferation* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016).

³ Vipin Narang and Nicholas Miller, "North Korea Defied the Theoretical Odds: What Can We Learn From Its Successful Nuclearization?" *Texas National Security Review* 1, no. 2 (2018), <https://tnsr.org/2018/02/north-korea-defied-theoretical-odds-can-learn-successful-nuclearization/>.

⁴ Etel Solingen, "What explains nuclear choices in East Asia?" *East Asia Forum*, 4 December 2017, <http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2017/12/04/what-explains-nuclear-choices-in-east-asia/>.

enforcement mechanisms. We may still lack a full systematic historical analysis of NPR effects on *all* members' nuclear choices, unsurprisingly since this entails a massive research effort. The NPR constituted a robust constraint in some cases, but it is possible that other--causally prior--considerations underlined motives for joining. The very conditions that led states to sign and ratify (selection effects), even if not always directly observable, could also explain subsequent compliance. We do observe that most states renounced nuclear weapons and that most ratified the NPT, but know much less about the precise causal sequence, temporal precedence, size of the NPR's presumed causal effect, and causal mechanisms. Those mechanisms may run through norms, domestic politics, and hegemonic inducements, all of which can deflect or reflect NPR effects. The (largely philosophical) question of whether states would have made different choices in a hypothetical regime-free environment remains. However, while a tempting theoretical exercise, this counterfactual may not only be most difficult to conduct but yield unconvincing results.⁵ As a matter of policy, the NPR had net positive effects even if those varied across states.

“Why would credible threats of force and sanctions lead to doubling down on nuclear pursuit in some cases but not others? The answer to this question may be linked to domestic regime survival considerations that do not necessarily line up conceptually with balances of (state) power.”

The seeming development of a nuclear taboo after Nagasaki gave rise to important work explaining non-

use of nuclear weapons since 1945.⁶ However, it is less clear that the same logic applies to explaining non/acquisition of nuclear weapons, since acquisition presumably circumvents use (via nuclear deterrence). Highly persuasive moral principles condemning nuclear acquisition clash with canonical deterrence theory entertaining the notion of a “conditional morality” embedded in nuclear weapons that are designed to prevent war.⁷ The putative norm of non-acquisition is contested and faces serious competitor norms. Dozens of states considered nuclear weapons even after the NPT's conclusion; some violated NPR commitments outright; and several still enjoy overwhelming domestic public support for such weapons (even in South Korea!). Some see rising nationalism and identity norms in South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan potentially leading to more fragile regional order and nuclear reversals.⁸ Yet the causal mechanisms connecting nationalism, historical memory and nuclear decisions are intricate and underexplored. Theories of domestic politics may help clarify why and how norms evolve, their relative receptivity, and their potential for diffusion across different historical and spatial contexts.⁹

Over 25 years ago I proposed that responses to the global economy and international institutions by two competing (ideal-typical) domestic models of political survival provide important clues regarding nuclear choices since the NPT's inception.¹⁰ Detailed historical analysis suggests that nuclear aspirants were more likely to emerge from domestic and regional political landscapes dominated by inward-looking models than from internationalizing ones. Inward-looking models/regions had greater incentives, and incurred fewer political, economic, reputational and others costs from exploiting nuclear weapons as tools of nationalist protectionism and survival in power. Internationalizing models/regions made the adoption of nuclear weapons less likely. There is substantial empirical support for how systematic differences between these two models

⁵ Richard Ned Lebow, *Forbidden Fruit: Counterfactuals and International Relations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010).

⁶ Thomas Schelling, “Who Will Have the Bomb?” *International Security* 1, no. 1 (1976): 77-91; Thomas Schelling, “The Legacy of Hiroshima: A Half-Century Without Nuclear War,” *Philosophy & Public Policy Quarterly* 20, no. 2/3 (2000): 9-13; Nina Tannenwald, *The Nuclear Taboo: The United States and the Non-Use of Nuclear Weapons Since 1945* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).

⁷ Joseph S. Nye, Jr., *Nuclear Ethics* (New York: Free Press, 1988); Robert Jervis, *The Meaning of the Nuclear*

Revolution: Statecraft and the Prospects of Armageddon (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989).

⁸ Etel Solingen, “Nuclear Proliferation: The Risks of Prediction,” in Alexandra Gheciu and William C. Wohlforth, eds., *The Oxford Handbook of International Security* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018).

⁹ Etel Solingen, “Of Dominoes and Firewalls: The Domestic, Regional, and Global Politics of International Diffusion,” *International Studies Quarterly* 56, no. 4 (2012): 631-644.

¹⁰ Etel Solingen, “The Political Economy of Nuclear Restraint,” *International Security* 19, no. 2 (1994): 126-169.

influence nuclear choices.¹¹ Every decision to abandon nuclear weapons since the NPT by states that had entertained them was nested in broader shifts towards internationalization. Only internationalizing models undertook credible commitments to renounce nuclear weapons in post-apartheid South Africa, Sadat's Egypt, Brazil, Argentina, South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, post-Franco's Spain, other European states, and Libya in 2003. Most did so without the benefits of a nuclear umbrella and where the latter existed, alliances were not always perceived as wholly reliable; yet alliances in those cases were mutually synergistic with (and perhaps derivative of) internationalizing models. Of all nuclear aspirants not one shifted to effective, transparent denuclearization under inward-looking models. Most defiant nuclear courses unfolded under inward-looking models (Argentina's Perón, Brazil's Getulio Vargas, Sukarno and Nasser; Saddam Hussein, Muammar Qaddafi, the Kim dynasty, Ahmadinejad, and Assad's Syria).

Yet the association between those models and nuclear choices is not deterministic. Resistance to the global economy and international regimes since the NPT's inception provides near necessary but insufficient conditions for acquiring nuclear weapons. The argument is bounded by specific scope conditions. First, a region's center of gravity—internationalizing or inward-looking—is consequential for modifying domestic preferences on nuclear choices. An internationalizing East Asia presented different incentives and constraints than a resiliently inward-looking Middle East, where the latter poses serious difficulties for internationalizers. Only autarkic North Korea pursued nuclear weapons in East Asia while several Middle East states embarked on that path. A second scope condition stems from prospect theoretic insights. People value more what they already have (“endowment effect”) than what they might get in an uncertain future; or are more averse to losing what they already possess for potential future gains.¹² Hence, it may be costlier politically to eliminate existing weapons than to reverse programs before they come to fruition. Reversals may also be harder when nuclearization precedes the inception of internationalizing models (e.g., China, India, Israel).

¹¹ Etel Solingen, *Nuclear Logics: Contrasting Paths in East Asia and the Middle East* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007).

¹² Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, “On the Interpretation of Intuitive Probability: A Reply to Jonathan Cohen,” *Cognition* 7, no. 4 (1979): 409-411; Cheryl Koopman, Eric Shiraev, Rose McDermott, Robert Jervis, and Jack Snyder, “Beliefs About International Security and Change in 1992 Among Russian and American National Security Elites,” *Peace and Conflict* 4,

As historical institutionalists know too well, temporality and sequencing matter.¹³

Models of political survival provide useful filters for weighing and re-ordering the relative importance of security dilemmas, norms, institutional incentives and other considerations. They may explain why we observe competing nuclear preferences by different actors in the same state; why nuclear policies vary over time in the same state (in tandem with shifting models); why states vary in compliance with NPT commitments; why security dilemmas are considered more (or less) intractable; why states rank alliances higher than self-reliance, or vice-versa; why and when external coercion and inducements may be more effective; why nuclear designs surfaced where security hardly justified them; why states renounced them where one might have expected them; and why the regional order—internationalizing or inward-looking—makes a difference. These models have become a more focal consideration, perhaps because of the rising relevance of populist-nationalist backlash against globalization and international institutions. Yet this framework also reminds us that complexity, temporality, and contingencies come with the territory.

Quantitative studies have not settled the battle of theoretical suitors in proliferation research. There are wide discrepancies regarding conceptual validity, measurement, and operationalization, as well as the appropriate variables and “universe of cases” to be included.¹⁴ Endogeneity is rampant and the dominant direction of causal effects often unclear. Studies largely ignore temporal effects including the NPT's inception, treating states as monolithic entities following continuous, coherent pathways. Contextual variables difficult to gauge and operationalize are excluded, including the role of the NPR (beyond strict membership), *political-economy* models (beyond trade ratios), or perceptions of status (beyond elusive measures of capacity). Bell's sophisticated tests led him to conclude that quantitative studies failed to offer strong explanations or predictions for proliferation patterns; neglected indirect causal pathways that are more difficult to capture; had little

no. 1 (1998): 35-57; Rose McDermott, “Prospect Theory in Political Science: Gains and Losses From the First Decade,” *Political Psychology* 25, no. 2 (2004): 289-312.

¹³ Orfeo Fioretos, ed., *International History and Politics in Time* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017).

¹⁴ Wilfred Wan and Etel Solingen, “International Security: Nuclear Proliferation,” in William R. Thompson, ed., *Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017).

to say about those drivers' actual causal strength; and included too many variables relative to the number of relevant cases.¹⁵ Hence, he argued, weak correlations between proliferation and many variables offered no proof whatsoever that those variables do not in fact cause or prevent proliferation. Some of these shortcomings clearly afflict various qualitative studies as well. Indeed, work across theoretical and methodological divides often slides into ahistorical reductionisms that curiously neglect good old *politics*, the ultimate subject of our discipline.

The analysis of nuclear choices cannot be divorced from history or politics. As Tetlock argued, good social science often requires tolerance for complexity, ambiguity, interaction effects among causal drivers, contingency, and historical context.¹⁶ Our understanding of the past and future of nuclear proliferation can hardly be advanced while neglecting empirical historical evidence and messy, dynamic, and non-linear politics. The comparative method in political science, attention to temporality, and the search for understanding causality are not mutually exclusive but eminently synergistic. At the same time, non-proliferation research must be acutely aware of ways in which deficient historical evidence may

privilege self-serving "reasons of state" (national security) as presumed motivations for developing or renouncing nuclear weapons, deliberately or inadvertently loading the evidentiary dice. This may well be the case for many cases, not least for, say, Switzerland. A Swiss official confidentially reflecting on why Switzerland shelved its putative nuclear ambitions expressed that "the banks would have not liked it," an argument deserving more attention than conventional theories or extant evidence grant it. Nonproliferation research remains especially vulnerable to public and private incentives to limit the availability of vital historical sources as well as to other potential bias and incompleteness in historical documentation. Yet this should not preclude proper exploration of areas where the light may be dimmer, especially if the proverbial keys lie far from the lamp. Uncovering true motives underlying nuclear choices may remain an extremely difficult, but also a crucial arena for testing and validating theories of international relations.

¹⁵ Mark S. Bell, "Examining Explanations for Nuclear Proliferation," *International Studies Quarterly* 60, no. 3 (2016): 520-529.

¹⁶ Philip E. Tetlock, *Expert Political Judgment: How Good Is It? How Can We Know?* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2017 [2005]).

IHAP 2018 Award Winners

The Robert L. Jervis and Paul Schroeder Book Award, 2018

This award is for the best book on International History and Politics. The award may be granted to a single-authored or multi-authored book, or to an edited volume, and will be given to works published in the calendar year prior to the year of the APSA meeting at which the award is presented. The copyright date of a book will establish the relevant year. We received over forty books for consideration this year covering a wide range of topics, suggesting that the International History and Politics field is both intellectually productive and substantively diverse. Many of these books were published by top university presses including Cambridge, Cornell, Oxford, Princeton and Yale.

We are very pleased to report that within this very deep field of outstanding monographs, we have selected *Justice and Reconciliation in World Politics* by Catherine Lu as our prize winner. *Justice and Reconciliation in World Politics* is an ambitious and path-breaking work that explores how individuals and states should settle accounts for the political catastrophes of the past.

Lu advocates for a structural approach to retributive justice. She argues that appropriate redress for victims' injuries and losses from historical abuses requires going beyond the duty of perpetrators to provide reparations to their victims. Individual, corporate and collective agents –even when not directly connected to abuse perpetrators – come to share moral responsibility for their participation in contemporary structural injustices. For Lu, a settling of historical accounts demands more than a reckoning of moral debts between individual victims and perpetrators to include a broader response to the persistence of structural injustice.

In *Justice and Reconciliation in World Politics*, Lu expertly bridges the fields of international relations and political theory while maintaining a strong focus on empirical case studies. A great strength of *Justice and Reconciliation in World Politics* is Lu's engagement with a wide range of historical examples. For example, Lu's analysis of the structural injustices associated with Japanese colonialism in Korea exposes the gender and class-based inequalities within Korean society that facilitated the Japanese military system of forced sexual slavery. Meticulously researched and clearly argued, *Justice and Reconciliation in World Politics* tackles some of the thorniest and most pressing issues in international politics. Her work suggests the relevance of international history for practices of justice and reconciliation today.

Committee members:

Lisa Blaydes (chair)
Rosella Cappella Zielinski
Jason Sharman

The Outstanding Article Award in International History and Politics, 2018

The Outstanding Article Award in International History and Politics recognizes exceptional peer-reviewed journal articles representing the mission of the International History and Politics Section of the American Political Science Association, including innovative work that brings new light to events and processes in international politics, encourages interdisciplinary conversations between political scientists and historians, and advances historiographical methods. The Outstanding Article Award is given to a published article that appeared in print in the calendar year preceding the APSA meeting at which the award is presented.

This year, the committee selected “The MAD Who Wasn’t There: Soviet Reactions to the Late Cold War Nuclear Balance,” by Brendan Green and Austin Long (*Security Studies* 24:4, pp. 606-641). In their article, Green and Long tackle an important research question, asking whether Soviet leaders believed in the existence of a stable nuclear balance with the United States in the later stages of the Cold War. Drawing on

compelling primary source evidence from both sides, Green and Long come to a striking conclusion: despite the apparent existence of mutually assured destruction and the possession of tens of thousands of nuclear weapons, Soviet leaders were chronically concerned about the nuclear balance, worried the United States might soon achieve a meaningful first strike capability, and made efforts to upgrade their arsenal accordingly. The findings have important implications for international relations theory, suggesting that nuclear weapons may not be nearly as stabilizing as optimists believe.

Committee members:

Seva Gunitsky (chair)

Nicholas Miller


Sheena Greitens

Q&A: The 2018 IHAP Award Winners

Each year, the IHAP section awards the **Robert L. Jervis and Paul W. Schroeder Best Book Award** and the **Outstanding Article Award in International History and Politics**. In 2018, the winners of these awards were **Catherine Lu** (for her book, *Justice and Reconciliation in World Politics*) and **Brendon Green and Austin Long** (for their article, “The MAD Who Wasn’t There: Soviet Reactions to the Late Cold War Nuclear Balance,” in *Security Studies* 26, no. 4).

The IHAP newsletter team interviewed the award winners. What follows are their responses.

Book award winner: Catherine Lu (McGill University): *Justice and Reconciliation in World Politics* (Cambridge University Press, 2017)



How did you become interested in the intersection between international history and politics? How did you become interested in reconciliation?

As a political theorist, I’ve been interested in theoretical questions about international relations since my undergraduate education at the University of British Columbia. For my dissertation, which I wrote at the University of Toronto, I was interested in the ethics of intervention, and pursuing this topic led me to realize the importance of history to understanding and assessing practices of intervention in world politics. I found it useful to think about the state and state sovereignty as historically evolved structures and principles, and this allowed me to compare the state to the family as another historically

evolved structure that makes claims to nonintervention in Western domestic contexts. Using insights from feminist theory and history, I showed that changes in conceptions of family privacy were analogous to changing conceptions of state sovereignty. This helped me to argue that realist, communitarian, and cosmopolitan arguments about the ethics of intervention were disciplined by differing accounts of the public/private distinction in international relations.

After that project, I became interested in reconciliation as a part of my interest in processes of ‘transitional justice’ that proliferated in the late 1990s. Although most of that literature focused on intrastate cases, I was interested in their application to contexts of international war, oppression and atrocity. The case of the post–World War I Versailles peace process perplexed me greatly, as the popular view was that it exemplified a case of the harsh pursuit of justice at the expense of reconciliation. I studied it with a view to try to clarify what justice and reconciliation meant in such a case, and how they were related as moral/political tasks. This has been an outstanding problem in the transitional justice literature, with scholars and practitioners often using the terms ‘justice’ and ‘reconciliation’ interchangeably.

I also became interested in reconciliation because of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada (2009-15), which aimed to rectify the national record about the injustice of the Indian Residential School system, as part of a settling of accounts for survivors. I continue to be interested in the limits and potential of such a process to transform relations between Indigenous peoples and the Canadian state and society. I challenged myself to read forceful critiques of reconciliation by Indigenous scholars, such as Taiaiake Alfred, and realized from his work that the problem of alienation lay at the heart of the challenge to reconciliation in settler colonial contexts. This case helped me greatly then to reinterpret what went wrong with the Versailles peace settlement, and to assess it as a case of an international transformation that reproduced both structural injustice and alienation, especially for colonized peoples within the international order.

Are there any scholars that you look to as role models? Or pieces of scholarship that you view as being templates for excellent research?

One book that I consider a piece of excellent scholarship is by David A. Welch, who became one of my PhD supervisors: *Justice and the Genesis of*

War (Cambridge University Press, 1995). The book connected my dual interests in political theory and international relations by showing the importance of ‘the justice motive’ in causing major wars. I saw connections between his argument that peoples’ behaviors are motivated by their senses of justice and injustice, and a major enterprise of political philosophy since Plato’s *Republic*, which is to interrogate peoples’ conceptions of justice, and expose their implications for what we may demand of ourselves, each other, and our institutional orders. David’s book also included exemplary historical case studies.

The scholar whose works I have admired most is Judith Shklar. Her intellectual interests were highly eclectic, and her style was unsettling and unconventional in her time. I especially appreciate her use of diverse literatures, from Greek tragedy to works of modern history, in the way that she did political theory. She was also a political theorist who I think pursued intellectual questions that were deeply informed by her personal and historical experience. I’ve always been interested in her conception of ‘passive injustice,’ articulated in her book, *The Faces of Injustice* (Yale University Press, 1990), which she characterizes as a failure of citizens in liberal democratic societies to enact their duties of citizenship and other role obligations. I think this concern also explains why I came to be attracted to the work of Iris Marion Young, whose work on ‘structural injustice’ has been deeply influential on my own work.

How do you navigate the tension between detailed historical research and macro theoretical claims; between contingency and generalizability?

In my work, I’m interested in conceptualizing what kinds of responsibilities we can bear for social and political injustices and harms. My accounts of interactional and structural justice are meant to capture two different levels or aspects of human social experience and reality. The interactional focuses on how agents treated each other, and involves the actions and omissions of particular agents involved in an interaction. The structural focuses on the background conditions in which agents interacted. At an interactional level, we can assess Japan’s responsibility for annexing Korea in 1910, or its responsibility for the war-time system of forced sexual labour and slavery. These events could be understood in purely interactional terms, requiring an account of who did what to whom. But such interactional accounts would be incomplete if they did not refer to the development of colonial

international order, or international rules about trafficking in women and girls, that provided the background structural conditions that enabled or supported such interactions. The fact of the internationalization of colonial practices of domination, as well as of strategies of resistance to such domination, matter for how we should understand the political projects of justice and reconciliation in response to colonialism. As I think Susan Pedersen’s book, *The Guardians* (Oxford University Press, 2015), demonstrates so well, the internationalization of colonial conflict was a byproduct of the new international order after World War I. But if this is historically significant as an account of how colonial interactions were reproduced, sustained, or entrenched, then it also has normative implications for how we think about who should be responsible for engaging in redressing colonial injustice.

What was the most challenging aspect of working with the historical material used in your book project?

My main goal in this book was not to provide a new empirically-based explanation of any particular political event or outcome, but to subject historical and contemporary practices of justice and reconciliation in international relations to normative analysis. As a political theorist, a challenge to using historical material as a source of normative and philosophical inquiry is that my use of such material is filtered through historians! As a consumer of what historians produce, I have to be careful about the reliability and validity of the historical evidence being presented. I find it useful to adopt a ‘Rashomon’ strategy when reading the work of historians, to remind myself that history is multi-perspectival.

What was the most unexpected thing you found in conducting your historical research?

One thing I did not expect was how much reading a good history of a major injustice, in all its complexity, would heighten the depth of moral gravity of historical wrongs. I found this in particular when reading David Olusoga and Casper W. Erichsen’s *The Kaiser’s Holocaust* (Faber and Faber, 2011), which details how Imperial Germany came to commit genocide against the Herero and Nama in German South West Africa between 1904-7, a case which figures prominently in my book. Sometimes, there is a concern that history, being complicated, excuses. This is why in my book, I argue that a truthful and comprehensive historical narrative in all its complexity, including a thorough account of the

agency of those who subsequently became victims, is vital to arriving at sound moral judgements about historical events. Acknowledging the agency of victims can facilitate a deeper appreciation of their full humanity, which in turn impresses upon us the deep moral gravity of the wrongs they came to suffer.

What do you think are the major differences in how political scientists and historians “do” history?

There are many different kinds of historians, and many different kinds of political scientists. I only hope that there is more engagement between historians and political scientists, including between historians and political theorists. I think political theorists who are interested in building action-guiding theories of global justice, or reparative, restorative, transformative, or transitional justice, or reconciliation, should read more history.

What would you like to see more of in terms of research into international history and politics, either methodologically or substantively?

Substantively, I hope that Indigenous sources of global history and politics will be more prominent in studies of international history and politics. If the current international order has been predicated on an account of civilization that entailed the destruction of indigeneity, we, as international relations scholars, should be concerned to ask whether that account can be discontinued or repudiated, and transformed into an alternative modernity that does not have genocidal implications.

I also think that ‘national’ fields in history and political science are less and less useful as analytical frameworks.

What do you think are the biggest lessons that publics and/or governments should take from your work?

Justice matters! Especially in the context of states such as Canada, the United States, Australia and New Zealand, I hope the message governments get from my book is that they cannot view the injustices experienced by Indigenous peoples as injustices of a distant past. They need to think about their responsibility for contemporary structural injustices—discursive, institutional, and material—that continue to place Indigenous peoples in social positions of ‘structural indignity,’ within their domestic orders, but also in contemporary international order. The Canadian government has

recently adopted the 2007 UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. How far will it go to repudiate Canada’s genocidal past? And what will it do to promote fundamental structural change, both domestically and globally? I think these are open questions, but I am not confident that the answer in the 21st century will be a happy one for Indigenous peoples.

Article award winners: Brendan Green and Austin Long, “The MAD Who Wasn’t There: Soviet Reactions to the Late Cold War Nuclear Balance,” *Security Studies* 26 (4): 606-641.



Brendan Rittenhouse Green, answering on behalf of himself and Austin Long:

How did you become interested in the intersection between international history and politics? How did you become interested in nuclear policy and military balance?

The intersection of international history and politics was just fundamental to the way I learned IR; to my mentors, the purpose of IR theory was to explain patterns in international history, so the link was natural.

I first became interested in nuclear policy and the military balance some dozen odd years ago when Austin, I, and other worthies would go to Frank’s Steak House in Cambridge Massachusetts. There we would get wildly drunk with Owen Reid Cote Jr.—associate director of the Security Studies Program at

MIT, an endless font of military wisdom—and he would explain that strategic submarines were not actually invulnerable, along with other mind-blowing facts about nuclear operations that went against received wisdom.

I started to write on the issue when Austin invited me to join him in expanding those conversations into an article, largely so that I could have something else to talk about on the job market beyond my dissertation. This article was eventually published in the *Journal of Strategic Studies* under the title “Stalking the Secure Second Strike,” where it also won an award, and led naturally to “The MAD Who Wasn’t There.”

What tips would you give graduate students or junior scholars interested in historical methods?

Learn another language or two. One of the most limiting aspects of my skill set is that it includes no foreign language training beyond a smattering of French. Austin fortunately has some Russian, but even so we were mostly limited to English sources in writing our article.

Are there any scholars that you look to as role models? Or pieces of scholarship that you view as being templates for excellent research?

In my opinion, Marc Trachtenberg towers above the rest of the field. His ability to use a theoretical lens for choosing and deeply investigating particular historical questions is unparalleled.

Practically any essay from his book *History and Strategy* is an excellent template for doing good work on theory and history. I particularly recommend chapter three, “A Wasting Asset,” and chapter six, on the Cuban Missile Crisis, which both use major theoretical questions about the nuclear balance as a motor for unearthing and synthesizing new historical data. And his masterwork, *A Constructed Peace*, is one of the greatest works of history I have ever read. I literally dropped the book when I got to the end of chapter five.

My best advice for graduate students and scholars interested in historical methods is actually to read everything Marc Trachtenberg has ever written—including his excellent book on historical methods, *The Craft of International History*—and imitate him.

How do you navigate the tension between detailed historical research and macro theoretical claims; between contingency and generalizability?

The key to any good work of political science is to match the theoretical endeavor with the empirical data available. Some macro-theoretical claims are very difficult to test with limited case studies. Others—particularly those from whom more fine-grained predictions can be teased—are better suited to detailed historical research.

Generalizing from a sample is always difficult no matter the method, so a good caution is just to be careful about what population you think you can generalize to. Historical contingency works the same way—truly contingent factors may explain some part of a puzzle, but they seldom explain the whole course of history. All actors are situated in a context and background that influences their actions. So, while it is important to acknowledge the contingent aspects of any given situation, usually an analytic narrative will be aimed at explaining the patterns.

The data collected for use in your article impressed a lot of people. What was the most challenging aspect of working with the historical material used in your article?

I was repeatedly frustrated that the secondary literature on the Soviet military basically disappeared after the end of the Cold War. Much of the article is based on Cold War sources, many of them American. Figuring out how to use these sources most effectively, and where primary sources existed that allowed us to stretch beyond them, was a challenge.

What was the most unexpected thing you found in conducting your historical research?

The Soviet obsession with avoiding pre-delegation and maintaining an almost obsessive negative control [making sure a weapon is never used without valid authorization] over their nuclear weapons was definitely a bit surprising; especially given an American experience that valued positive control [making sure that weapons are always used when needed] much more highly.

What do you think are the major differences in how political scientists and historians “do” history?

Undoubtedly. The first job of the historian is to say what happened. The first job of the political scientist is to try to explain patterns. This leads to somewhat different concepts of what a political scientist might call “IVs” and “DVs,” and also to different narrative structures. That said, I think that good historical and political science treatments of the same question will

often converge. The differences between the two disciplines are not huge.

What would you like to see more of in terms of research into international history and politics, either methodologically or substantively?

It's hard for me to make any methodological complaint that I wouldn't have to cop to being guilty of myself. Substantively, I think that the Cold War experience with arms control is understudied, and that there is a wealth of theoretically relevant material just waiting to be exploited.

What do you think are the biggest lessons that publics and/or governments should take from your work? What can readers take from this article in relation to recent major political developments concerning nuclear weapons, such as the status of NPT and the current North Korea nuclear crisis?

Maybe the biggest lesson is that, for an emerging nuclear state, obtaining nuclear weapons is the beginning of its problems, not the end. The United States managed to put a tremendous amount of pressure on the Soviet Union through nuclear competition, despite having a fundamentally much more difficult military problem than it faces today. A similar competition might well be crippling to a state with a much lower resource base, like North Korea. This means that smaller states have less to gain from proliferation, and the United States less to fear, than is commonly assumed in the policy debate. This is not to dismiss the significance of proliferation, but simply to ask that we avoid truncating the political story at the point when an arsenal emerges. Keeping that arsenal survivable over time is not a simple task, and the effort to do so can shape politics in important ways.

Much of security studies is built of knowledge and data that originates from the US. This article does a wonderful job at looking an alternative perspective. What advantages and disadvantages are there when examining non-US cases?

The advantage is explained in the premise of the question—different states provide different perspectives. Therefore, the analyst can often be drawn to the importance of different kinds of variables or background conditions that are important for understanding state behavior. The disadvantage is that no other state on earth makes available the kind of data that the United States does, which makes it difficult to fully evaluate every argument the way one might want to.

It seems hard for governments and democratic publics to learn from history. What do you think we could do differently to communicate international historical research to “real world” actors?

I don't think communicating historical research is difficult at all. Policymakers frequently reason by way of historical examples, and if you can get it in front of them, find it quite easy to read good history. The biggest problem is that policymakers don't have very much time to read things, and this can make them prone to misusing historical examples rather than understanding them. The best antidote is publish the results of scholarship in the wider “policy press” as well as academic journals. If scholarly findings can be placed in an explicit policy framework, and disseminated to the wide community of government officials and think tankers in DC, they can find traction. Websites like War on the Rocks and the *Texas National Security Review* are especially good for this kind of thing.

Democratic publics, on the other hand, are basically hopeless.

Upcoming Events and Workshops

September 2018

BITSS Research Transparency and Reproducibility Training (RT2)
September 5th – 7th, 2018, Los Angeles, USA
[More Information](#)

MANCEP (Manchester Centre for Political Theory) Workshops 2018
September 10th – 12nd, 2018, Manchester, UK
[More Information](#)

12nd Pan-European Conference on International Relations
September 12nd – 15th, 2018, Prague, Czech Republic
[More Information](#)

2nd Jagiellonian Interdisciplinary Security Conference
September 17th – 19th, 2018, Kraków, Poland
[More Information](#)

ISA West Annual Conference 2018
September 21st – 22nd, 2018, Pasadena, California, USA
[More Information](#)

5th World Conference on Remedies to Racial and Ethnic Economic Inequality
September 26th – 29th, 2018, Vitória, Brazil
[More Information](#)

October 2018

ISA-South Conference 2018
October 12nd – 13rd, 2018, Ashland, Virginia, USA
[More Information](#)

16th Annual Association for Political Theory (APT) Conference
October 18th – 20th, 2018, Philadelphia, USA
[More Information](#)

Great Plains Political Science Association Annual Meeting
October 26th – 27th, 2018, Maryville, Missouri, USA
[More Information](#)

7th EISA Exploratory Symposia
October 31st – November 3rd, 2018, Rapallo, Italy
[More Information](#)

November 2018

ESMOAS Annual Academic Conference 2018
November 1st – 3rd, 2018, Texas, USA
[More Information](#)

ISA-Northeast Conference 2018
November 2nd – 3rd, 2018, Baltimore, Maryland, USA
[More Information](#)

4th International Academic Conference on Human Security
November 2nd – 3rd, 2018, Belgrade City, Serbia
[More Information](#)

50th Northeastern Political Science Association (NPSA) Annual Conference
November 8th – 10th, 2018, Montreal, Canada
[More Information](#)

ISSS-IS Conference 2018
November 9th – 11th, 2018, West Lafayette, Indiana, USA.
[More Information](#)

Workshop on Political Economy & Political Science (PEPS) 2018
November 14th – 16th, 2018, Chile
[More Information](#)

ISA Innovative Pedagogy Conference 2018
November 15th, 2018, St. Louis, Missouri, USA
[More Information](#)

ISA-Midwest Conference 2018
November 16th – 18th, 2018, St. Louis, Missouri, USA
[More Information](#)

2018 Telos Israel Conference
November 18th – 20th, 2018, Haifa, Israel
[More Information](#)

The Ethics of Business, Trade & Governance: An Interdisciplinary Governance
November 30th – December 1st, 2018, New Hampshire, USA
[More Information](#)

January 2019

2019 International Adam Smith Society Conference
January 18th – 20th, 2019, Southern California, USA

[More Information](#)

February 2019

12nd Annual Conference on the Political Economy of
International Organizations

February 7th – 9th, 2019, Salzburg, Austria

[More Information](#)

March 2019

AAS annual conference 2019

March 21st – 24th, 2019, Denver, USA

[More Information](#)

ISA 60th Annual Convention

March 27th – 30th, 2019, Toronto, Canada

[More Information](#)

April 2019

77th Annual Midwest Political Science Association
(MPSA) conference

April 4th – 7th, 2019, Chicago, Illinois, USA

[More Information](#)

ECPR's Joint Sessions of Workshops

April 8th – 12nd, 2019, Mons, Belgium

[More Information](#)

May 2019

AAS workshop, "Law, Society, and Justice"

May 17th – 19th, 2019, Michigan, USA

[More Information](#)